
Foreign Policy and the Centerpiece Question in Nigeria

Remi Chukwudi Okeke, Ph.D

Department of Public Administration
Madonna University, Okija Campus, Anambra State
Nigeria

Jeremiah Nwachukwu Eze

Department of International Relations
Madonna University, Okija Campus, Anambra State
Nigeria

ABSTRACT

This essay re-examines the issue of foreign policy and the centerpiece question in Nigeria. The current contribution therefore actually borders on the reexamination of a subsisting debate in Nigeria's foreign policy dispositions. The problem of the study emanates from a supposition that Nigeria's foreign policy is currently at grievous loose ends, or at best, only residing in the mysterious imaginations of the nation's international relations managers. The central research question of this work is accordingly concisely denotable as follows: Whither foreign policy and the centerpiece question in Nigeria? Consequently, the objectives of the study are to (i) interrogate the issue of foreign policy and the centerpiece question in Nigeria (ii) revisit the issue of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy and (iii) make recommendations on the way forward for the Nigerian state in purposeful foreign policy designs. Data for the study was generated from secondary sources, and the data analysis framed on systematic argumentation. The theoretical framework of the paper is the realist theory of international relations. The paper finally proposes a reimagined reintroduction of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy, in opposition to the current foreign policy uncertainties in the country.

KEYWORDS: *Foreign policy, Nigeria's foreign policy, foreign policy objectives, foreign policy analysis, the centerpiece question in Nigeria*

INTRODUCTION

The current opaque records of the otherwise prodigious African state of Nigeria in contemporary global affairs have continued to elicit research attention (Gubak, 2015; Adekaiyaoja, 2017; Odubajo, 2017; Olowojolu, 2017; Ujara & Ibietan, 2018, Adebisi, 2019). The present scenarios raise issues bordering on the nation's foreign policy contents and their possibly faltering trajectories. But what is foreign policy? This crucial question necessitates at the onset of the ensuing interrogations some conceptual disambiguation. Foreign policies are thus the principles that guide the actions of governments in the international arena. The objectives that states pursue in a given international relationship or situations are accordingly dependent on the foreign policies of such states. Foreign policy is the theme of the foreign relations of a state, the essence and soul of its diplomacy. Invariably, diplomacy refers to the process by which foreign policy is executed. Furthermore in these related contexts, and the embedded elucidations, international relations refer to the interfaces between and among states and more generically, denote the academic discipline which studies the workings of the international system(s). International relations are therefore functions of foreign policies (Palmer & Perkins, 1969; Adeniran, 1983; Mclean, & McMillan, 2003; Goldstein &

Pevehouse, 2010; Adebisi, 2019). And although many scholars use these terms interchangeably, they all definitely have their different meanings.

Consequently, foreign policies of highly regarded states are not disjointed questions. Such policies may be dynamic in character but certainly not usually devoid of their fundamental underpinnings. This gives rise to the centerpiece issue in foreign policy formulation (in Nigeria) and it further leads to the suppositions of “a national foreign policy” as opposed to the scenario of “foreign policies” in the international affairs of nations. The principal research question of this article thus borders on what is the centerpiece of contemporary Nigerian foreign policy? The general objective of the work therefore is to study foreign policy and the centerpiece question in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study are to (i) interrogate the issue of foreign policy and the centerpiece question in Nigeria (ii) revisit the issue of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy and (iii) make recommendations on the way forward for the Nigerian state in purposeful foreign policy focus. The theoretical framework of the paper is the realist theory of international relations, also known as realism and sometimes called the power theory. The methodology of the contribution is purposively normative, and certainly centers on systematic argumentation

LITERATURE REVIEW

On the fiftieth anniversary of Nigeria’s independence in 2010, Ezirim (2011) conducted a robust review of the country’s foreign policy (within the half-century-period). This was against the background of a persisting debate on whether Nigeria’s foreign policy had been consistent or incoherent over these years. Ezirim then highlighted the prevalent position in extant literature as that of foreign policy consistency in the country. Adopting the decision-making theory of analysis, this contribution then opined that although there was relative consistency in the foreign policy thrust (which remained pro-African) there has also been inconsistency in diplomacy. This is because; different national leaders in the country had apparently imposed their personalities in the accomplishment of foreign policy goals of the state. The paper finally recommends the “putting of square pegs in square roles” in the management of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

In the viewpoints of Nwanolue & Iwuoha (2012) Nigeria has over the years lived with the informal recognition and big name as the ‘giant of Africa’ and probably because of her immense population size (the largest in Africa) and her huge oil wealth, placed this diplomatic privilege at the disposal of other African nations. In the process, the country has given both unsolicited and solicited supports to her African neighbours by positively intervening in their domestic crises, providing humanitarian supports, doling out billions of naira and dollars as aid, sending technical aid corps, forming intervention military troops and deploying them as the need arose. In most cases, however, these diplomatic good gestures were extended against the backdrop of pressing domestic interests and challenges, giving rise to an apparent disconnect between what was given out and the expected returns. Nwanolue & Iwuoha consequently investigated what the researchers perceived as “Nigeria’s flamboyant foreign policy thrust in Africa and the ironical diminishment of Nigeria’s prominence and economic value both at home and abroad”.

Employing a qualitative method of data collection and analysis Nwanolue & Iwuoha (2012) argued that the excessive involvement of the Nigerian nation in Africa’s problems, in defiance of the imperatives of squarely tackling the home challenges bordered on the acquisition of cheap fame, and has rather made the country unpopular and diminished whatever prestige that had been built. The researchers argued that the beneficiary states never appreciated such benefaction, but rather in recompense sabotaged Nigeria’s other interests in global affairs. They wondered why Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust at the time of their work in 2012 had not fundamentally shifted from the ‘Africa centerpiece’ inclination, concluding that

for Nigeria to achieve sustainable economic and political development, “a holistic revision and redirection of the country’s blind focus on Africa was necessary”.

The contribution of Abdul & Ibrahim (2013) focused on the attempts of the Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) to rebuild the military-tainted image of Nigeria in the international community. The researchers opined that the Nigerian nation recorded significant gains in these regards through the administration’s shuttle diplomacy. This paper recommends among other issues that the focus of “Nigeria’s foreign policy should no longer be limited to continental affairs” but must be extended worldwide and directed towards promoting the nation’s cultural heritage, and the building of economic, scientific and technical cooperation with other nations and viable international partners. Principally, Abdul & Ibrahim (2013) have provided a highly valid account of the Obasanjo administration’s accomplishments in the area of Nigeria’s diplomatic relations.

Against the background of Nigeria’s post-military regimes’ framework for turning the country into one of the twenty leading economies on earth by the year 2020 (vision 20:2020), Nwankwo (2013) examined the foreign policy initiatives of President Goodluck Jonathan (2010 to 2015). Identifying the welfare of the state and its people, as the ultimate goal of foreign policy, the work interrogated the extent to which this goal was the driving force of Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Jonathan. The study found that the foreign policy initiatives of the administration were concentrated more than ever before in Nigeria, on “domestic priorities”, particularly (as in the estimation of the study) contained in the vision 20:2020 compendium. In the opinion of Nwankwo (2013), this signified a paradigm shift, compared with the past, when African issues ruled Nigeria’s international attention.

There is also the study of Talibu (2016) which examined Nigeria’s multilateral policy in relation to its hegemonic tendencies in Africa since 1960. This work evaluated the degree to which Nigeria could be regarded as a regional power in Africa and how such seeming hegemonic ranks have been maintained through multilateral institutions. The study accordingly identified those areas where Nigeria had demonstrated these hegemonic tendencies in multilateral institutions. The work employed the qualitative method of data collection. It considered the Hegemonic Stability Theory, Role Theory and Regional Security Complex Theory as the most apposite theories that could explain Nigeria’s multilateral policies vis-à-vis its regional hegemonic standing in Africa. The researcher came to the conclusion for this theoretical framework by triangulating his qualitative data sources, including focus-group interviews, semi-structured interviews, elite interviews, archival sources, documentary analysis, analysis of speeches, several official reports, textbooks, journal articles and newspapers.

Talibu’s study suggests that Nigeria dominated the African political landscape through the following roles: decolonization struggle, the dismantling of apartheid regimes in Southern African countries, several peacekeeping operations, human capacity building, and the promotion of democracy, and the financing of regional multilateral organisations. The study shows that in playing the aforementioned roles, there were internal and external factors which dictated Nigeria’s multilateral policy postures since independence. Some of these factors as identified by the study bordered on security, geography, relationship with the country’s immediate neighbours, population, economics, influence of extra-African powers and financial capability. This study equally evaluated the multilateral policy of Nigeria and found that there were areas of successes as well as others of failures.

This work’s historical overview of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the post-independence period suggests that the country’s multilateral policy received a boost in the 1970s under Generals Yakubu Gowon and Olusegun Obasanjo as leaders at different times. In an overall context, the study has made a contribution in the area of the role regional powers play in the governance of their regions. The work has also shed some light on the exercise of hegemonic

powers at regional levels through multilateralism. For further research efforts, the study recommended the employment of unilateralism and bilateralism in studying the foreign policy of Nigeria in the regards of the country's regional hegemonic postures in Africa.

According to Ugwuja (2016) the arrival of Nigeria as a player on the international turf signaled immense hope for the continent of Africa. Hence, Nigeria's emergence in the seemingly disordered international system was anchored on a philosophical trajectory hoisted unmistakably on African values and interests. Ugwuja (2016) posits however, that extant literature suggests that Nigeria has not commensurably gained in framing her international relations primarily on African values and interests. Deploying constructivist theory as analytical framework, and focusing on the specific cases of Nigeria's bilateral relations with Ghana, South Africa and Angola, Ugwuja's work investigated the gains and costs of essentially framing Nigeria's international relations on African interests and values. The researcher found that African interests and values as philosophical praxis have possibly favoured Nigeria in some other engagements but not necessarily in her international relations, as the country "gave and gave and got nothing in return". The study saw a pressing need for "dismantling, overhauling and reinventing" the philosophical hues of Nigeria's international relations, as already recommended by extant works and also proposed the adoption of policies capable of ensuring that Nigeria recovers all she had lost in her years of African centered naivety in international relations.

Ola (2017) submits that since Nigeria adopted Africa as the centerpiece of the country's foreign policy it has played the role of an African regional leader. But this has also led to a generic feeling that the Nigerian national treasury is an infinite source of funds for the development of the continent. The principal question of Nigeria's foreign policy has then started to border on the degree of assistance it should offer its African neighbours. Premised on the axiom that charity begins at home; there have then been pervasive pressures to concentrate efforts on the nation's internal problems before continuing to help the neighbours. It is suggested in this work that "since there is nothing substantial to show for the numerous assistance to the neighbours, Nigeria should review its foreign policy trusts to garner socioeconomic benefits for the nation since foreign policies are meant to drive the economy of a nation and not strain it" (Ola, 2017).

Piate (2017) critiqued what the researcher denoted as "the leadership pathology that bedevils Nigeria's hegemonic ambition in Africa", particularly the disconnection between the development of the country's power resources and envisaged continental leadership role. He underscores this as "Nigeria's attempt to play a hegemonic role in Africa without a fundamental domestic capacity to sustain such role". This study thus examined the degree to which Nigeria used its putative leadership position in Africa to catalyze tangible development at the domestic front. In similarity with the current study, Piate adopted political realism otherwise known as the power approach as the theoretical template of his own work. The utility of this theory in his estimation is that states in international relations are always driven by their national interests attainable only by enhancing the factors of their national power relative to the other states in the international arena. This contribution found that the Nigerian state "consistently pursued its domestic development goals in isolation of its foreign policy objectives. This paper recommends that the generic Nigerian foreign policy may remain Africa-centred but with more inward-focus, aimed at adding value to national development in Nigeria.

The study of Nwodim (2018) related the concept of Africa as centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy to the ideology of Pan Africanism, the philosophy that emerged in reaction to the adverse effects of imperialism and colonialism in Africa. The paper thus identified the concept of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy as an expression of the country's Pan Africanist commitments. Framing the study on Classical Marxist Theory of

Imperialism, secondary sources of data from books, periodicals and magazines were analyzed for this research contribution. The paper demonstrated that consecutive Nigerian governments had sustained “immense commitment to this principle, as Nigeria has always played prominent role in issues affecting the African continent” be it political, economic or social. It was further implied in the work that while playing the “big brother” role in Africa, Nigeria continued to experience domestic economic retardation, to the detriment of her citizenry. The paper suggested a reappraisal of Nigeria’s foreign policy with the country’s interests and that of its citizens given the primary consideration when making foreign policy decisions.

Bakare (2019) investigated Nigeria’s foreign policy trajectory in the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) from 1960-2002. He highlighted that after Nigeria attained independence in 1960, the country immediately positioned its foreign policy objectives in tune with OAU’s objectives which included total decolonization of Africa and the socio-economic development of the continent. This paper’s analysis focused on Nigeria’s foreign policy in its engagement within the OAU and how this had translated into the actualization of the Organization’s pan-Africanist ideology before its transmutation into the African Union (AU) in 2002. Bakare’s thesis is that Nigeria’s efforts in the OAU from 1963 towards the 1990s were directed at facilitating the decolonization of Africa, and not necessarily to nurture democracy.

Oshewolo (2019) believes that among the principles guiding Nigeria’s foreign policy is Afrocentrism, as this notion embodies two interweaved ideas. It is in the first place designed to promote the interest and wellbeing of African countries through various inter and intra-African diplomatic avenues. Secondly, the motive for adopting a representative posture on behalf of Africa in international forums and the tremendous costs incurred in the process is to possibly boost Nigeria’s status as Africa’s acclaimed leader. Notwithstanding the achievements and embedded sacrifices in the maintenance of this policy, the contributor opines, Nigeria has also continued to endure some lingering disappointments and inconveniences. Oshewolo therefore contends that the underlying philosophies of the country’s Afrocentric policy must be reassessed. According to Oshewolo, in the indeterminate world of realism-based diplomacy, Nigeria must consider an ‘imperialistic’ agenda in its foreign policy equations in Africa.

Ola (2019) therefore wonders whether Nigeria’s Afrocentric foreign policy-postures were still tenable in the 21st century. Ola argues that since the 1960s, when Africa became the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the country’s human and material resources’ commitments in prosecuting the African diplomatic enterprise was never in doubt. But Nigeria at a point, Ola asserts, particularly from “the second half of the 1980s and most of the 1990s”, gravitated from “reaching a crescendo to receding into a diminuendo”. Afterward, deposes this researcher, Nigeria became more associated with corruption, primitive capital accumulation and a seeming lack of direction on the route to achieving national development. According to Ola (2019) under such scenarios therefore, the country’s earlier successes appeared to have been written on water while its failures seemed to have been cast in stone.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper’s theoretical framework is the realist theory of international relations, particularly its state-centric trajectories. Then within an overall context of realism, the work is specifically anchored on Hans Morgenthau’s power theory. But to start from the beginning, the realist theory of international relations, also known as realism or political realism (and sometimes called the power theory) is one of the general theoretical approaches to the study of international relations. Korab-Karpowicz (2017) highlights that power theory is usually deployed in contrast with idealism or liberalism, which tends to call attention to cooperation.

Realists regard the states as principal actors in international relations. These states act in pursuit of their own national interests; they struggle for power and are mainly concerned with their own security. Korab-Karpowicz underscores the adverse side of the realists' courting of power and self-interest, as having to do with their cynicism towards ethical norms in international relations.

The names most usually included among the founding fathers of realism are Thucydides, Hobbes and Machiavelli (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017). The inclusion of Thucydides as a realist is however currently seen as minority reading (Donnelly, 2005). Realism incorporates a diversity of approaches in a long theoretical tradition (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017). Thus, there is usually a distinction between classical realism, represented by such twentieth-century realists as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr and extreme or radical realism. For instance, there is the classical realism which emphasizes the concept of national interest; as different from the Machiavellian doctrine "that anything is justified by reason of state" (Bull 1995 in Korab-Karpowicz, 2017). Exemplary twentieth-century realists accordingly include Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan, and Kenneth Waltz in the United States, and then E. H. Carr in Britain (Donnelly, 2005). But Carr and Morgenthau were perhaps among the most influential twentieth-century classical realists, with the most famous work of Carr probably being "The twenty years' crisis: 1919–1939: An introduction to the study of international relations" (Carr, 2001/1939). However, it was actually Morgenthau who developed realism into a far-reaching theory of international relations. Hence, in his magnum opus entitled, "Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace" (first published in 1948) Morgenthau argued that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power" (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017).

There is indeed no single, consistent definition of realism (Usiemure & Lawson, 2018). Donnelly in Usiemure & Gbighidje (2018) accordingly posits that the realist theory is not denoted by a specific set of suppositions and propositions, as realism incorporates a diversity of methodological approaches in a long theoretical tradition (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017). This variety of approaches significantly includes the state-centric hue of realism under which it is held that the nation-state is the principle actor in international relations (Antunes, & Camisão, 2017). But the major assumptions of realism may be summarized as follows: The international system is anarchic, and is in a way dangerous; states are rational and unitary actors, and are the major actors in the international system, then the states while struggling for survival, usually follow the principle of self-help (Usiemure & Gbighidje, 2018). The state-centric trajectory of this articles framework of realism is consequently reemphasized. According to Lake (2007, p.1):

The state is central to the study of international relations and likely to remain so into the foreseeable future...Even scholars who give prominence to non-state actors are typically concerned with understanding or changing state practice....International relations as a discipline is chiefly concerned with what states do and, in turn, how their actions affect other states.

Lake (2007, p.1) further argues that "both as objects and units of analysis, international relations is largely about states and their interactions". The state-centric model underscores the states as the primary actors in international relations. State-centric scholars do not deny the existence of non-state actors. Waltz (1979) in Lake (2007, p.2) therefore asserts that states have never been and can never be the only international actors as the importance of non-state actors and the far-reaching scope of transnational activities in foreign relations are unambiguous. The principal contention however is that states, and particularly great powers, are such amply significant actors that any constructive theory of international relations must

place the state-centric hue at its core. State-centric theorists thus assume that states may possess or be reasonably assumed to possess a national interest in which nations have comparatively consistent policy preferences (Lake, 2007).

But there are seemingly two valid grounds on which the state-centric model of realism may be criticized. The first of such arguments is that there may be no such thing as the “national interest”, as “different issues create and mobilize different political cleavages within societies” The second issue is that states now seem to have “lost control over private (non-state) actors who can organize and move across national boundaries, either as cosmopolitan individuals, multinational corporations, or transnational advocacy networks.” Modern communication and transportation technologies have also further favored transnational groups and permit them to evade state control (Lake, 2007). A counter argument in the first case is that despite the dissensions on the issue in question, once the policy is enacted, it becomes equally binding on all citizens. Therefore to discredit the notion of national interests is not to deflate the importance of state authority, in using states as units of analysis in international relations. The second ground of criticism is undoubtedly more difficult to debunk. This however indicates that the state-centric shade of the realist theoretical framework of international relations is not unassailable. But the reality remains that it continues to be undoubtedly high-ranking among the analytical frameworks of international relations.

The application of realism and state-centrism to this article’s interrogations and propositions essentially draw impetus from the position of Adebawo & Obadare (2010). According to these contributors in Okeke (2018, p.132) Nigeria “contains perhaps, the greatest combination and concentration of human and natural resources that can be (re)mobilized in creating an African power state, with a capacity to stand at the vortex, if not the center of continental revival and racial renewal.” Africa has been (perhaps justifiably) historically depicted and treated as the most lethargic, reactionary, and most perilous of the continents on the planet, and possibly a location possessing no great shakes in global influence (Severin, 1973; Jarosz, 1992; Stott, 1989; Morlin-Yron, 2019; Ozoemena, 2017). Curiously, the Covid-19 pandemic which erupted in the course of this research did not emanate from Africa. In the wake of the Covid-19 cataclysm, this article sets out to investigate how the Nigerian state, with the greatest concentration and combination of material and human resources at her disposal, may remobilize these capitals and possessions, to create an African power state which can stand at the center of continental eminence for global competitiveness.

THE CENTERPIECE QUESTION AND THE ORIGINS OF FOREIGN POLICY ARTICULATION AND APPLICATION IN NIGERIA: A CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW

The aboriginal African focus of Nigeria’s foreign policy was already evident at the country’s independence from Britain in 1960. The interests of Nigeria’s first Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Bewa in African affairs was accordingly never really in doubt. Bewa remained concerned about the wellbeing of Africans and total African freedom. His foreign policy focus recognized Africa as Nigeria’s key interest in the attendant diplomacies. Indeed, in his Nigeria’s acceptance speech at the United Nations on October 8, 1960 the new nation’s Prime Minister (Bewa) categorically identified Africa as the primary concern of his foreign policy. In his commitments to the decolonization, progress and unity of Africa therefore, Bewa played leading roles in the formation of OAU - the Organization of African Unity - in 1963 and also in 1964 – in the formation of the Chad Basin Commission. Subsequently, Nigeria under Prime Minister Bewa contributed immensely to the funding OAU’s Liberation Committee, and on January 5, 1961 severed relations with France, after the

country carried out the third nuclear test in the Sahara on December 27, 1960. In 1961, the Belewa regime also took an active part in the expulsion of racist South Africa from the Commonwealth. In continuation of his Afrocentric foreign policy implementation, Belewa offered assistance (a non-military military type) such as medical staff training and other administrative supports to the provisional independent government of Angola under Holden Robert (Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012).

THE MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NIGERIA

This section of the article begins on the note that Nigeria's military undoubtedly raised the country's foreign relations to some heights of distinction. But it was also the same military-turncoats that brought the same relations to their all-time nadir. After obtaining independence from her former British colonial masters in 1960, by January 1966 the nation's military had toppled the civilian regime of the newly independent country for reasons that only the first military coup plotters can acceptably explain. The army remained in government in the country from 1966 to 1999 and only intermittently permitting civilian experiments in governance, particularly between 1979 and 1983 when the armed forces struck again to take over. Parenthetically, the same military had precipitated a civil war in the country between 1967 and 1970. Consequently, although the framework of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy was crafted by the country's aboriginal civilian government, it was the military in governance than ran with the policy to consummate pedestals.

The military governments of Generals Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975), Murtala Mohammed (1975-1976) and Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979) all retained the policy of Africa at the center of Nigeria's foreign relations (Morasso, 2019). Then after the civilian interregnum of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983), which also feebly retained the Afrocentric foreign policy thrust of the country, the subsequent military regimes of Mohammed Buhari (1983-1985), Babangida (1985-1993), Sani Abacha (1993-1998) and the transitory regime of Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1999) all professed the African focus of the nation's foreign policy. Nwanolue & Iwuoha (2012) have agreeably chronicled the accomplishments of the various military regimes in the regards of maintaining the extant Afrocentric essence of the country's foreign policy.

But most international relations scholars would agree that individuals matter in world politics and foreign relations (Baumann, & Stengel, 2014). There were accordingly two of such poignantly military-related diplomats in Nigeria, who as diplomatic foot soldiers, immensely contributed to the overall outline of Nigeria's foreign policy and diplomacy in their times of military regimes in Nigeria. There was Major General Joseph Nanven Garba, Nigeria's Federal Commissioner for External Affairs (1975-1978) and President of the United Nations General Assembly (1989-1990), who as chairman of the United Nations' Special Committee against Apartheid eminently led the global fight against racial discrimination in South Africa. There was also Major General Henry Adefope, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1979), President of the Nigerian Olympic Committee (1967-1976), Vice-President of the Commonwealth Games Federation (1974-1982) and member of the International Olympic Committee from 1985 to 2006 (Lewis, 2002; Afriquejet, 2012). These two individuals eminently contributed to the credibility of Nigeria's voice in international affairs during the finally inglorious military era.

Indeed, while the military held sway in Nigeria, the otherwise certified dictators correspondingly contradicted some preconceived notions about military tendencies in foreign affairs, usually assumed to tend towards authoritarianism. Aluko in Ojeh (2015, p.31) opined that it was out of place to think about the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, under military regimes, such skepticisms deriving from the ostensive illogicality and mismatch between the two extremities of order and despotism, as signified by public opinion and

militarism. Ojeh's work actually focused on the Ibrahim Babangida military regime (1985-1993) in Nigeria and the extensive International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan debate (1985) in the country, bordering on economic diplomacy and the desirability or not of the country accessing the IMF facility. Ojeh's statistical calculation and interpretation of generated data gave a 79% level of Nigerian citizens' opposition to the IMF facility, and consequently validated the Babangida regime's claim to have rejected the loan, on account of Nigerians' massive opposition to the proposition. Ojeh's study thus concluded that "popular diplomacy in governments' foreign policy decision-making would not necessarily be a product of regime-type".

However, it remains axiomatic that people who wish to dine with the devil must go with long spoons. What brand of economic diplomacy did the rejection of the IMF loan-offer beget for Nigeria? The IMF conditionalities for accessing the facility were eventually, fully implemented in the country without the funds-accompaniment being manifestly availed (Iyayi, 1989; Anyanwu, 1992; Okoro, 2012; Ademiluyi, 2019). Upon the rejection of the loan, the Babangida regime embarked on a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) under which it "carefully smuggled the IMF conditionalities into the nation's economic recovery programme through the back door" (Okoro, 2012, p.840). According to Anyanwu (1992, pp.9-10) three major external debt management approaches were adopted under the SAP, namely, rescheduling, refinancing and new loan agreements. A number of such agreements were accordingly reached and signed with separate countries, the London and Paris clubs, (about US\$5, 556, 3 million) and other negotiations continued. The new arrangements involved the procurement of new external loans, either for export development, trade support, or stand-by facility. A number of such loans were since the inception of the SAP, accordingly secured from the World Bank, for example, the US\$452 million trade policy and export development loan in 1986/87 and the IMF US\$780 million stand-by arrangement. Invariably, public opinion was no longer in consideration as the Babangida military government embarked on this brand of foreign economic relations. But in an overall context of these scenarios, the Babangida administration's foreign policy probably found its most potent expression in economic diplomacy (Ujara & Ibietan, 2018).

Then Under General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) Nigeria virtually became an outcast state under which international relations were earthily mismanaged, a type of recluse-country which declared an apparently aimless tug-of-war against the rest of humanity (Okpokpo, 2000). Among the baffling acts of the Abacha military regime in the country was the insistence on hanging the "Ogoni nine" (including Ken Saro Wiwa, all the dead, largely perceived as environmental activists) when Commonwealth Heads of State and Government were meeting in Australia. Even if government's military tribunal had sentenced them to death by such fate (for being responsible for the earlier killing of the group of "Ogoni Elders") it was only diplomatic insensitivity that made Abacha and his acolytes not to tarry till the summit's end for the resultant butcheries. This regime was largely judged by the international community to have unjustly imprisoned many eminent Nigerians, including the later President Olusegun Obasanjo, and also repugnantly killed many others (Okpokpo, 2000).

Invariably, Abacha's brand of Afrocentrism could not have emanated from foreign relations altruism. Nigeria's foreign policy indeed became both isolationist and militant under General Abacha. In his variety of African-focused foreign policy therefore, under the auspices of the Economic Community of West Africa States' Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the Nigerian dictator deployed some enormous financial and logistical resources into restoring democracy in Liberia in 1997 and in Sierra Leone in 1998. But the incongruous democratic postures of the Nigerian military leader were widely perceived as merely using

the Nigeria Armed Forces in the pursuit of an unnecessarily aggressive foreign policy (Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012; Osakwe & Audu, 2017; Famoye, 2018; Ujara & Ibieta, 2018).

NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-MILITARY DISPENSATION

The foreign policy of a state truly refers to the guiding principle of the state in her relationship with the international community. It is usually anchored on national interest as articulated by different generations of state leaders. In the state-centric notion of international relations therefore, foreign policy implies the guiding principle of state-to-state relations, and the policies that dictate the attitudes and responses of the state to the other non-state actors in the international community. Similar to national interest, which is a concourse of interests, foreign policy is an amalgam of policies. Foreign policy and national interest are accordingly inseparable in international relations. What then constitutes Nigeria's national interest in international relations at this point? What should constitute the national interest of the contemporary Nigerian state in international relations? It is further underscored in this section of the paper that the focus of the work is on foreign policy and not on diplomacy. It is not on the activities of Nigerian leaders and diplomats in international affairs but on the premises of their actions.

All Nigeria's post-military governments of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), Umaru Musa Yar'Adua (2007-2010) and Goodluck Jonathan (2011-2015) therefore largely maintained the position of Africa at the center point of their different regimes' foreign policies (Morasso, 2019). In these regards, President Obasanjo played very critical roles in the crystallization and implementation of the ideas behind the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and also in the turning of the erstwhile Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), as he subsequently became the first chairman of the Union. President Obasanjo was also deeply involved in the peaceful settlement of innumerable inter-state and intra state conflicts in Africa, while committing massive fiscal and time resources to this African irredentism. The Obasanjo administration was accordingly credited with rebuilding through the president's shuttle diplomacy the country's international image dented particularly by the ill-famed Abacha leadership. Obasanjo embarked on an adroit shuttle diplomacy across the major global capital cities and the entire Africa (Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012; Abdul & Ibrahim, 2013). Hence, between May 1999 and August 2002 alone, President Obasanjo made a total of 113 international trips (Adeola & Ogunnoiki, 2015; Ujara & Ibieta, 2018).

And before the cold hands of death struck and took away President Obasanjo's successor (President Umaru Yar'Adua) he had on May 29, 2008 in Abuja, Nigeria's capital also stated in a televised question-and-answer-session that Africa remained the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy (Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012). The truth however is that in the post-Military dispensation in Nigeria, the declaration of these principles has continued to border on mere equivocations. For example, while addressing a retreat on the review of Nigeria's foreign policy on Monday 1st August, 2011, President Jonathan, who succeeded Yar'Adua as President asserted:

We should rather be looking at how we can deploy our foreign policy at the service of our nation's domestic priorities...we have no choice but to adjust and adapt the way we conduct foreign policy. As we respond to the forces of globalization, perhaps more than ever before, our diplomacy must be put at the service of our domestic priorities (Jonathan, 2011).

When the above presidential position is compared with imaginable declarations such as: "Nigeria's foreign policy will continue to be guided by Africa as the centerpiece", or "the foreign policy of Nigeria will remain guided by our national interests", the earlier presidential statements fall short of expectation in lucidity and finesse. What precisely is referred to by a

nation's foreign policy being put at the service of the nation's domestic priorities or the country's diplomacy being put at the service of her domestic priorities? Essentially, these policy prevarications emanate from the positions of the critics who think that it has been extremely naive of Nigeria to have restricted its foreign policy-theme to Africa as its centerpiece. Such critics think it was laudable to do so before the 1990s, prior to moving into the next millennium but that Africa as the cornerstone of the country's foreign policy no longer sufficed; that a broader perspective had become necessary. To such thinkers, even where Nigeria lacked the means and might of a global foreign policy, it should have considered current trends in foreign policy and diplomacy such as human rights or democracy and globalization, in crafting the contents of her international relations. According to Okpokpo (2000) successive military dictators in Nigeria merely used the Africa centerpiece slogan to lure compliant and similarly dictatorial African regimes into supporting the unpopular policies of each other.

Okpokpo opined that as Nigeria became a democracy again since 1999 she needed to speak out and stand tall within the international community, not having to seek the support of the other brutal regimes in Africa for limited gains within the continental diplomatic community. This contributor condemned the notion of Africa alone being the reason for foreign policy in Nigeria. Okpokpo concluded that none of the important international actors, such as the Great Britain, France and USA built their enormous foreign policy reputations on only one pillar, advising that Nigeria should not be an exception if the country wants to play significant roles in current global high level diplomatic circles.

However, a major issue that the proponents of Nigeria's need to wondrously transit into the status of a world power seem to continue to disregard, is that prior to such outstanding transmutations, the ambitious country must have self-evidently become a domestic power. The logic of such transition is to move from a powerful home-status to a continental level of power, before transcending to the global power pedestal. Indeed, the positive linkages between domestic and foreign policies have been demonstrated by several scholars. Although such relationships are not usually clear-cut in some cases, the associations are definitive and distinct in many others (Pehe, 1998; Akihiko, 2000; Hill, 2003; Bektemirova, 2015; Bojang, 2018; Keeble, 2019). Tigers do not go about proclaiming their "tigritudes". They pounce (Soyinka, 1962). Nations who aspire to be world powers today should at least provide consistent electricity power supply for domestic and business use by her citizens, a basic necessity in contemporary times that is still egregiously lacking in the Nigerian state.

WHEN DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS ATTEMPT DICTATING TO AFRICA

There is a palpable leadership void in Africa that the centerpiece question should ideally address. While Africans live in denial of such vacuities their development partners capitalize on such contradictions to attempt to dictate what obtains in the continent. There is an illustrative scenario in the African Development Bank (AfDB). Founded in 1964, the AfDB Group is currently made up of three constituent institutions: The African Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF). The shareholders of the AfDB consist of 54 African nations as regional member countries (RMCs) and 26 non-African states as non-regional member countries (NRMCs). The overarching goal of the group is the promotion of sustainable economic growth in Africa, and the reduction of poverty on the continent by spurring sustainable economic development, and social progress in the regional member countries (African Development Bank, 2020a).

The multilateral development bank (one of the world's five largest of such institutions) has 80 shareholders, 54 of which are African countries, while others are from Europe, Asia and the Americas (Agence France-Presse, 2020). The bank's statement of subscription and voting powers as at 31 December 2019 places Nigeria in the lead, with 611,452 total votes

and 9.369 voting powers, followed by the United States of America with 434,069 total votes and 6.651 voting powers (African Development Bank, 2020b). Dr. Akinwumi Adesina of Nigeria assumed office on September 1, 2015 as the first Nigerian to lead the 56-year-old banking organization (Babatunde, 2015; AFP, 2020). Then a few months to the annual general meeting of the bank scheduled to hold in August 2020, where Adesina was expected to be returned unopposed as President, an undercover “group of concerned staff members” of the institution submitted a report against him. The group called for an investigation into Adesina’s governance records, human resources practices and management deals (Vanguard News, 2020). They accused Adesina of “multiple cases of abuse and breaches of the bank’s code of ethics” (Odeh, 2020).

The ethics committee of the bank which investigated the allegations however found no evidence against the AfDB President and exonerated him completely, the case was then dismissed as none of the allegations was proved by the “whistle-blowers”. The bank’s Ethics Committee in its report “described the allegations as frivolous, baseless, and without merit or evidence” (Odeh, 2020). But the US Treasury Secretary, Mr. Steven Mnuchin, on behalf of his country rejected the bank’s exoneration of its leader, and called for an independent probe into the allegations against Adesina (Vanguard News, 2020). The United States’ government insisted that the Board of Governors of the bank “must demonstrate that the institution takes governance, anti-corruption, and transparency seriously” (Udo, 2020). It is invariably expected that if Nigeria nominated Adesina to lead the African Development Bank as the first Nigerian to be so supported in the 56-years history of the bank, he must be one of Nigeria’s best candidates for the high-profile position. This became a test-case for the African centerpiece question in Nigerian diplomacy.

The Nigerian government promptly rejected the United States’ call for fresh investigations, already supported by other national shareholders of the bank such as Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, after the AfDB president, Adesina had been cleared by the bank’s authorities. In Nigeria’s letter addressed to the Chairperson of the AfDB Board of Governors by Nigeria’s Minister of Finance, Budget and National Planning, the country argued that the new investigation being canvassed by the United States and her other supporters was outside the bank’s laid-down rules, procedures and governing system and its Articles relating to the Code of Conduct on Ethics for the president of the group. The Nigerian authorities interpreted the episode as a plot by Adesina’s adversaries to deny him and invariably the country a renewed tenure at the leadership of the important multilateral agency.

But a particularly distasteful trajectory of the surrounding questions in the AfDB-related Nigeria’s diplomatic relations is that a Nigerian of such international standing was being accused of corruption. Adesina insists on his guiltlessness, deposing that a transparent and impartial investigation would ultimately ascertain his innocence (Odeh, 2020). Domestic issues and foreign relations are never water-tightly separable. Nigeria’s development partners are conversant with the country’s narratives in public and private sector ethical shortcomings, bordering on the infamy of Nigerian sleazy officials and other corruption-prone citizens. Fraudulent practices are not peculiarly attributable to any nation but the contemporary history of Nigeria-America relations calls for some sobriety by the African nation when the United States makes allusions to fraud. Among the Nigerian Igbos (one of the major ethnic nationalities in the country) there is an adage that when a proverb alludes to tatty baskets the nearby old woman invariably begins to feel ill at ease.

What informs the United States’ audacity in wanting Adesina indicted at all costs? In August 2019, the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arraigned eighty people for what it called “the largest case of online fraud in United States history.” Seventy-seven of these suspects were Nigerian citizens. Differently also arraigned for computer and wire fraud

was a Nigerian national indicted of defrauding a subsidiary of Caterpillar (the American Fortune 100 Construction machinery and equipment firm) of \$11 million in only one online scam. Earlier in 2016 the famous American business magazine, Forbes had named this particular suspect, with business interests in Nigeria, Zambia and South Africa, as one of its 30 top under-thirty African entrepreneurs. Another young Nigerian who was on the FBI's most wanted list for many years was eventually convicted of \$40m fraud in 2013 (Campbell, 2019; Nwaubani, 2019).

Nigerian leaders' historical proclivity to loot their country's treasury is beyond belief. But in this article, illustration shall only be made with the case of General Sani Abacha. The late General Abacha was Nigeria's Military Head of State between 1993 and 1998. It has remained extremely difficult to trace where his stupendous loots are hidden on the face of the earth or even to quantify them. But Transparency International once estimated that Abacha had stolen up to \$5bn from Nigeria between 1993 and 1998, when he eventually died in office (Nwabughio, 2020). Different countries have been cooperating with Nigeria to return the uncovered Abacha plunders to the dispossessed country and these include the following states: Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Jersey Island in United Kingdom and the United States of America. Campbell (2019) then posits: "There is little question that Nigeria is damaged by its international reputation for fraud. It contributes to the reluctance of international investors to acquire Nigerian partnerships".

Consequently, on this particular occasion of the United States' led attempt to question the integrity and credibility of a Nigerian banking delegate it becomes a challenge for the country to prove to others that all her officials cannot be freely accused of corruption. It is indeed only on such grounds of ethical impropriety that Africa's development partners may locate foundations for dictating to the continent on how to conduct her affairs when Africa is supposedly the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Igwe (2010, p.11) potently contends that pristine African societies harbored no thieves and criminals. The concept of Africa as centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy can also be framed on the template that modern Africa forbids public sector shenanigans, lawlessness and criminality. It is not a matter of sloganeering but issues of commitment to unimpeachable conduct, as Nigerian-African international bureaucrats become the ethically formidable representatives of Africa in diplomatic and business circles. Africa can be the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy in these regards.

BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC MYOPIA AND AFRICAN HEGEMONY: WHITHER NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Even in the realm of foreign relations, myopia has a thorny meaning. It is accordingly defective to conclude that all the lexical and empirical connotations of myopia are pejorative. Myopia can mean both short-sightedness and nearsightedness. It does not always refer to poverty of sight. Many people who are biologically short-sighted are stupendously effective in their vocations as this begins to accurately associate myopia with nearsightedness which is not precisely a deformity. But back to the sphere of international relations, diplomatic circles and the centerpiece question. It is consequently contended in this article that if the notion of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy becomes interpretable as myopia, it is not a diplomatic deformity. It refers to nearsightedness, to see Africa first before conceptualizing the global vision. The point is not about hegemony and domination of the other African nations by the Nigerian state, the germane issues relate more with the Nigerian nation critically focusing on primarily being an African powerful country. For instance, a country that is universally noted for having a zero tolerance for corruption is a powerful country, which citizens would be respected globally. The other country that parades the international arena seeking to be classified as a powerful state, but other countries rigidly

keep away from her nationals because of public and private sector sleaze, is only powerful in negativity. Nearly all the potential visitors to this hypothetical country would be likeminded bandits.

Critics of the continuity of the foreign policy paradigm denoting Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's diplomacy are indeed numerous. They easily choreograph a catalogue of Nigeria's irredentist interventions and other largesse-extensions made to different parts of Africa (by the country) for which no apparent reciprocities were recorded (Umezurike & Asuelime, 2015; Ola, 2017; Oshewolo, 2019). Such Nigerian foreign policy critics impugn the value of the practice whereby the country nearly became an African *Baba Chaghaloo* (the mythical Afghan gift-bringer). Some of these disapprovals of Nigeria's African foreign policy postures consequently come short of advocating that the country becomes a new diplomatic recluse because of bad faith from the country's African brethren. Some suggestions have thus been made to the effect that "the most rational economic path for the country in the pursuit of foreign policy is to be Nigerian centred" (Nwodim, 2018, p.82). This probably refers to the notion of foreign policies being functions of national interest, as foreign policies of states are actually functions of the underlying principles of the national interests of such states (Odubajo, 2017).

Invariably, Nigeria's diplomatic relations over the years have been immersed in a multiplicity of cognomens including in the current post-military dispensation, citizen diplomacy under which the citizen is considered the centerpiece of foreign policy (Dickson, 2010; Aleyomi & Abu Bakar, 2017; Ujara & Ibietan, 2018). This contribution considers this diversity of centerpieces unconstructive and in the tradition of political realism favours the original variety of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Political realism in international relations is a tradition of analysis which stresses the imperatives that states face to pursue power politics of the national interest (Donnelly, 2005). The proposed continuing retention of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy is undoubtedly in tune with power politics of the national interest type. But a particularly fundamental issue in covertly readopting Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy is that the country must endeavour to metamorphose at the minimum into an African economic power. It will not require the knowledge of rocket science to engage in this brand of power transmutation, neither does this suggestion entail coaching the economic-development ambitions of the country in unconscious Gross Domestic Product (GDP) paradigms and other esoteric economic theorizations. If for instance the Nigerian state may only become a world renowned agricultural power, that is economic power already. An African current tiger that lacks ordinary economic power is a debilitated giant; such a state-creature cannot effectually coordinate its generic foreign relations more so to consider where its centerpiece resides.

CONCLUSION

The truth is that Nigeria's foreign policy is currently characterized by uncertainties. The country must for that reason rejig the foreign policy's centerpiece. The foreign policies of powerful countries are not rambling businesses. Their fundamental anchorages are definitive, even while the operational trajectories may become dynamic. Properly denoting (reaccepting) Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy should not be a war slogan (for the conquest of Africa by Nigeria) and must not remain an inchoate diplomatic jingle that means little or nothing to the rest of the international community. It needs to become a development-oriented motto of Nigeria's foreign policy, aimed at presenting the country as an African masterpiece. It requires a development-oriented re-imagination, such that Nigerian statesmen and diplomats, when they move about outside Africa, and observe how others have turned their own areas into centers of attraction, they return to Africa, commencing from their home country, to replicate the splendor they adore in the other locations. The centerpiece question

remains relevant in the foreign policy postures of Nigeria, the giant-sized African continental leadership candidate. Destiny has irrevocably placed the disputed African colossus in her current location. Her foreign policy therefore needs to accord with this irrevocability as Africa decidedly remains the centerpiece of the country's diplomatic relations.

REFERENCES

- Abdul, S. U., & Ibrahim, M. B. (2013). Interrogating Nigeria's foreign policy in the 21st century: Reflections on the gains and challenges of Obasanjo's administration 1999-2007. *Bassey Andah Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 6(-), 34-50.
- Adebanwi, W., & Obadare, E. (2010). Introducing Nigeria at fifty: The nation in narration. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28(4), 379-405.
- Adebisi, P.A. (2019). Nigeria's Foreign Policy under Buhari's Administration, 2015-2019: An Analysis of Achievements and Challenges. *JABU International Journal of Social and Management Sciences*, 7(1), 279-290.
- Ademiluyi, A. (2019). RUGA through the back door? <https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/283516/ruga-through-the-back-door.html>.
- Adeniran, T. (1983). *Introduction to International Relations*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Macmillan.
- Adeola, G. L., & Ogunnoiki, A. O. (2015). The pursuance of Nigeria's domestic and foreign policy in the fourth republic: Complementarity or contradiction. *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 1 (4), 434-444.
- African Development Bank, (2020a). Corporate Information. Retrieved from <https://www.afdb.org/en/about/corporate-information>.
- African Development Bank, (2020b). AfDB - Statement of subscription and voting powers as at 31 December 2019. Retrieved from <https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/afdb-statement-subscription-and-voting-powers-31-december-2019>.
- Afriquetjet, (2012). Former Nigerian IOC member, Adefope, dies at 86. Retrieved from <https://archive.is/20120730072314/http://www.afriquetjet.com/former-nigerian-ioc-member-adefope-dies-at-86-2012031234881.html>
- Agence France-Presse, (2020). African Development Bank: 'No Decision' yet on demands for probe. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/africa/african-development-bank-no-decision-yet-demands-probe>.
- Akihiko T. (2000). Domestic politics and foreign policy. In: Takashi I., Jain P. (Eds.), *Japanese Foreign Policy Today* (pp. 3-17). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Aleyomi, M.B., & Abu Bakar, M.Z.B. (2017). The challenges of citizen diplomacy in Nigeria project, 2007-2010. *People: International Journal of Social Sciences*, 3(2), 1227-1250.
- Aluko, O. (1981). *Essays in Nigerian foreign policy*. London, UK: Allen & Unwin.
- Antunes, S., & Camisão, I. (2017). Realism. In McGlinchey, S., Walters, R., & Scheinplflug C. (Eds.) *International Relations Theory* (pp.15-21), Bristol, England: E- International Relations Publishing.
- Anyanwu, J. C. (1992). President Babangida's structural adjustment programme and inflation in Nigeria., *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 7(1), 5-24.
- Babatunde, J. (2015). How Adesina won AfDB presidency. Retrieved from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/06/how-adesina-won-afdb-presidency/>.

- Bakare, O. (2019). The trajectory of Nigeria's foreign policy in the Organisation of African Unity (1960-2002): Democratization or Decolonization of Africa? *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Review*, 5(3), 11-17.
- Baumann, R., & Stengel, F. A. (2014). Foreign policy analysis, globalisation and non-state actors: State-centric after all?. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 17(4), 489-521.
- Bektemirova, N. (2015). Interaction of foreign and domestic factors in the international political process: The case of Russia. *Strategic Analysis*, 39(5), 541-547.
- Bull, H. (1995). The theory of international politics 1919-1969. In J. D. Derian (Ed.), *International theory: Critical investigations*. London, UK: MacMillan.
- Bojang, A. S. (2018). The study of foreign policy in international relations. *Journal of Political Science and Public Affairs*, 6(4), 1-9.
- Campbell, J. (2019). U.S. arrests celebrated Nigerian entrepreneur for fraud. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-arrests-celebrated-nigerian-entrepreneur-fraud>
- Carr, E. H. (2001) [1939]. *The twenty years' crisis: 1919-1939*. New York, NY: Harper Perennial.
- Dickson, M. (2010). Citizen diplomacy in President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua's Nigeria, 2007-2009: An assessment. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 1(1.3), 1-13.
- Donnelly, J. (2005). Realism. In S. Burchill et al (Eds), *Theories of International Relations* (3rd ed., pp. 29-54). New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ezirim, G. E. (2011). Fifty Years of Nigeria's Foreign Policy: A Critical Review. *African Political Science Review*, 10(1), 2-4.
- Famoye, A. D. (2018). Regional Peacekeeping and the Transformation of Nigerian Foreign Policy, 1990-2000: A Perspective. *Canadian Social Science*, 14(9), 17-21.
- Goldstein, J. S., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2010). *International Relations* (9th ed.). New York, NY: Longman.
- Gubak, H. D. (2015). Impact of State Weakness on Nigerian Foreign Policy Reputation: A critical analysis. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 5(12), 633- 642.
- Hill, C. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Igwe, S. C. (2010). *How Africa underdeveloped Africa*. Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Professional Printers & Publishers.
- Iyayi, F. (1989). The trouble with Babangida. *Index on Censorship*, 18(2), 9-13.
- Jarosz, L. (1992). Constructing the dark continent: Metaphor as geographic representation of Africa. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 74(2), 105-115.
- Jonathan, G. E. (2011). Address Goodluck Ebele Jonathan as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at a Retreat on the Review of Nigeria's Foreign Monday. Retrieved from <https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/57255/address-by-his-excellency-goodluck-ebele-jonathan.html>.
- Keeble, C. (2019). (Ed.) *The Soviet State: The domestic roots of Soviet foreign policy*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Korab-Karpowicz, W. J. (2017). Political realism in international relations. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/>.
- Lake, D. A. (2007). The state and international relations. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1004423.

- Lewis, P. (2002). Joseph Garba, 58, a Nigerian Coup Plotter and, Later, a Diplomat.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/05/world/joseph-garba-58-a-nigerian-coup-plotter-and-later-a-diplomat.html>.
- Mclean, I. & McMillan, A. (2003). *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
<https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199207800.001.0001/acref-9780199207800-e-660?rskey=xFdoMg&result=713>.
- Morasso, C. M. (2019). Afrocentric and regional leadership: An approach to the identity of Nigerian foreign policy. *Brazilian Journal*, 4(7), 151-167.
- Morlin-Yron, S. (2019). What's the real size of Africa? How Western states used maps to downplay size of continent. Retrieved from
<https://www.africanbusinesscentral.com/2016/08/25/whats-the-real-size-of-africa-how-western-states-used-maps-to-downplay-size-of-continent-photos/>.
- Nwabughogu, L. (2020). Abacha Loot: How much did the late Head of State steal? Retrieved From <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/03/abacha-loot-how-much-did-the-late-head-of-state-steal/>.
- Nwankwo, O. B. (2013). Shifting the paradigm in Nigeria's foreign policy: Goodluck Jonathan and Nigeria's vision 20: 2020. *Social Sciences*, 2(6), 212-221.
- Nwanolue, B. O. G., & Iwuoha, V. C. (2012). A reflection on Nigeria's past: Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy revisited. *Developing Country Studies*, 2(4), 76-84.
- Nwaubani, A. T. (2019). Letter from Africa: Why Nigeria's internet scammers are 'role models'. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49759392>.
- Nwodim, O. (2018). Appraising the Afro-centeredness of Nigeria's foreign policy. *Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research*, 4(4), 74-83.
- Odeh, N. (2020). Why the US wants Adesina out as AfDB President. Retrieved from <https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2020/05/29/why-the-us-wants-adesina-out-as-afdb-president/>.
- Odubajo, T. (2017). Domestic environmental variables and foreign policy articulation of the Buhari Administration in Nigeria's fourth republic. *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, 6(11), 73-96.
- Ojeh, C. (2015). Popular diplomacy in an autocracy: Public opinion and foreign policy decision-making under the military in Nigeria. *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, 38(2), 29-54.
- Okeke, R. (2018). The Oduche Complex and the Public Policy Environment in Africa: A Nigerian Case Study. *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, 40(1), 131-154.
- Okoro, K. N. (2012). Nigeria and the socio-economic globalization of the 20th century: A historical re-consideration. *International Journal of Development and Sustainability*, 1(3), 834-859.
- Okpokpo, E. (2000). The challenges facing Nigeria's foreign policy in the next millennium. *African Studies Quarterly*, 3(3), 31-36.
- Ola, T. P. (2017). Nigeria's assistance to African states: What are the Benefits? *International Journal of Development and Sustainability*, 6(2), 54-65.
- Ola, T. P. (2019). Nigeria's Afro-centric foreign policy in the twenty-first century. *IUP Journal of International Relations*, 13(4), 41-50.
- Olowojolu, O. (2017). Midterm report of President Muhammadu Buhari's foreign policy. *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society*, 9(2), 1-12.

- Osakwe, C. C., & Audu, B. N. (2017). The Nigeria led ECOMOG military intervention and interest in the Sierra Leone crisis: An overview. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 8(4 S1), 107-115.
- Oshewolo, S. A. (2019). Reconsideration of the Afrocentric principle in Nigeria's foreign policy framework. *GeoJournal* <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-019-10114-1>.
- Ozoemena, R. N. (2017). Right to development 'Shining the Light' on Africa. *Africa Insight*, 47(3), 27-38.
- Palmer, N. D., & Perkins, H. C. (1969). *International relations: The world community in transition*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Pehe, J. (1998). Connections between domestic and foreign policy. *Perspectives*, 10(-), 61-64. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/23615812.
- Piate, S. M. (2017). Nigeria's foreign policy, regional leadership and the crisis of neocolonial development, 1960–2016. *Socialscientia: Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 2(1), 46-68.
- Severin, T. (1973). *The African Adventure: Four Hundred Years of Exploration in the Dangerous Continent*. New York, NY: Dutton.
- Soyinka, W. (1962). Wole Soyinka: Quotes. https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Wole_Soyinka.
- Stott, R. (1989). The Dark Continent: Africa as Female Body in Haggard's Adventure Fiction. *Feminist Review*, 32(1), 69-89.
- Talibu, O. (2016). *Multilateralism and the hegemonic posture of a regional power: A case study of Nigeria, 1960-2015* (Doctoral Dissertation, Universiti Utara Malaysia).
- Udo, B. (2020). AfDB: U.S. govt demands fresh probe into allegations against Adesina. Retrieved from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/394422-afdb-u-s-govt-demands-fresh-probe-into-allegations-against-adesina.html>.
- Ugwuja, A. A. (2016). Shades of African values and interests in Nigeria's international relations: Investigating the gains and the costs, 1960–2014. *OGIRISI: A New Journal of African Studies*, 12(s), 35-53.
- Ujara, E. C., & Ibietan, J. (2018). Foreign Policy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: A Critical Analysis of Some Unresolved Issues. *Journal of International and Global Studies* Volume, 10(1), 41-57.
- Umezurike, S. A., & Asuelime, L. E. (2015). Exploring diplomatic crisis of Nigeria and South Africa between 1994 and 2013. *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, 4(1), 65-73.
- Usiemure, O. C., & Gbigbidje, D. L. (2018). Realist theory of international relations. *International Scholar Journal of Arts and Social Science Research*, 1(1), 11-11.
- Vanguard News, (2020). Uncovering the atrocious plot to tarnish Adesina's legacy at Africa's apex bank. Retrieved from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/05/uncovering-the-atrocious-plot-to-tarnish-adesinas-legacy-at-africas-apex-bank>.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.